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2 SAHARON SHELAH
§ 0. Introduction
§ 0(A). The Question.
Let Gn,p be the random graph with set of nodes [n] = {1, . . . , n}, each edge of
probability p ∈ [0, 1]R, the edges being drawn independently, see ⊞2 below. On
0-1 laws (and random graphs) see the book of Spencer [Spe01] or Alon-Spencer
[AS08], in particular on the behaviour of the random graph Gn,1/nα for α ∈ (0, 1)R
irrational. On finite model theory see Flum-Ebbinghaus [EF06], e.g. on the logic
L∞,k (see §1) and on LFP (least fixed point
1) logic. A characteristic example of
what can be expressed by it is “in the graph G there is a path from the node x
to node y”; this is closed to what we use. We know that Gn,p, i.e. p constant
satisfies the 0-1 law for first order logic (proved independently by Fagin [Fag76]
and Glebskii-et-al [GKLT69]). This holds also for many stronger logics like L∞,k
and LFP logic. If α ∈ (0, 1)R is irrational, the 0-1 law holds for Gn,(1/nα) and first
order logic, see e.g. [AS08].
The question we address is whether this holds also for stronger logics as above.
Though our main aim is to address the problem for the case of graphs, the proof
seems more transparent when we have two random graph relations (we make them
directed graphs just for extra transparency). So here we shall deal with two cases
A and B. In Case A, the usual graph, we have to show that there are (just first
order) formulas ϕℓ(x, y) for ℓ = 1, 2 with some special properties (actually also ϕ0),
see Claim 1.2. For Case B, those formulas are Rℓ(x, y), ℓ = 1, 2, the two directed
graph relations. Note that (for Case B), the satisfaction of the cases of the Rℓ are
decided directly by the drawing and so are independent, whereas for Case A there
are (small) dependencies for different pairs, so the probability estimates are more
complicated.
In the case of constant probability p ∈ (0, 1)R, the 0-1 law is strong: it is obtained
by proving elimination of quantifier and it works also for stronger logics: L∞,k (see
§2) and so also for the LFP logic LLFP. Another worthwhile case is:
⊞1 Gn,1/nα where α ∈ (0, 1)R; so pn = 1/n
α.
Again the edges are drawn independently but the probability depends on n.
The 0-1 law holds if α is irrational, but we have elimination of quantifiers only
up to (Boolean combinations of) existential formulas. Do we have 0-1 law also for
those stronger logics? We shall show that by proving that for some so called scheme
of interpretation ϕ¯, for random enough Gn, ϕ¯ interpret number theory up to mn
where mn is not too small, e.g. mn ≥ log2 log2(n).
A somewhat related problem asks whether for some logic the 0-1 law holds for
Gn,p (e.g. p =
1
2 ) but does not have the elimination of quantifiers, see [Sh:1077].
We now try to informally describe the proof, naturally concentrating on case B.
Fix reals α1 < α2 from (0,
1
4 )R for transparency, so α¯ = (α1, α2) letting α(ℓ) = αℓ;
⊞2 let the random digraph Gn,α¯ = ([n], R1, R2) = ([n], R
Gn,α¯
1 , R
Gn,α¯
2 ) with
R1, R2 irreflexive 2-place relations drawn as follows:
1There are some variants, but those are immaterial for our perspective
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(a) for each a 6= b, we draw a truth value for R2(a, b) with probability
1
n1−α2
for yes
(b) for each a 6= b, we draw a truth value for R1(a, b) with probability
1
n1+α1
for yes
(c) those drawings are independent.
Now for random enough digraph G = Gn = Gn,α¯ = ([n], R1, R2) and node a ∈ G;
we try to define the set Sk = SG,a,k of nodes of G not from ∪{Sm : m < k} by
induction on k as follows:
For k = 0 let Sk = {a}. Assume S0, . . . , Sk has been chosen, and we shall choose
Sk+1.
⊞3 For ι = 1, 2 we ask: is there an Rι-edge (a, b) with a ∈ Sk and b not from
∪{Sm : m ≤ k}?
If the answer is no for both ι = 1, 2 we stop and let height(a,G) = k. If the answer
is yes for ι = 1, we let Sk+1 be the set of b such that for some a the pair (a, b) is
as above for ι = 1. If the answer is no for ι = 1 but yes for ι = 2 we define Sk+1
similarly using ι = 2.
Let the height of G be max{height(a,G) : a ∈ G}.
Now we can prove that for every random enough Gn, for a ∈ Gn or easier - for
most a ∈ Gn, for every not too large k we have:
⊞4 SGn,a,k is on the one hand not empty and on the other hand with ≤ n
2α2
members.
This is proved by drawing the edges not all at once but in k stages. In stage m ≤ k
we already can compute SGn,a,0, . . . , SGn,a,m and we have already drawn all the
R1-edges and R2-edges having first node in SGn,a,0 ∪ · · · ∪ SGn,a,m−1; that is for
every such pair (a, b) we draw the truth values of R1(a, b), R2(a, b). For m = 0 this
is clear. So arriving to m we can draw the edges having the first node in Sm and
not dealt with earlier, and hence can compute Sm+1.
The point is that in the question ⊞3 above, if the answer is yes for ι = 1 then the
number of nodes in Sm+1 will be small, almost surely smaller than in Sm because
its expected value is |Sm| · |[n] −
⋃
ℓ≤m
Sℓ| ·
1
n1+α1
≤ n1+2α2−(1+α1) = n2α2−α1 and
the drawings are independent so except for an event of very small probability this
is what will occur. Further, if for ι = 1 the answer is no but for ι = 2 the answer is
yes then almost surely Sm is smaller than a number near n
α1 but it is known that
the R2-valency of any node of Gn is near to n
α2 . Of course, the “almost surely”
is such that the probability that at least one undesirable event mentioned above
occurs is negligible.
So the desired inequality holds.
By a similar argument, if we stop at k then there is no R2-edge from Sk into
[n]\(S0 ∪ . . . Sk) so the expected value is ≥ |Sk| · (n −
∑
ℓ≤k
(Sk)) ·
1
n1−α2
hence in
S0 ∪ · · · ∪Sk there are many nodes, e.g. at least near n/2 by a crude argument. As
each Sm is not too large necessarily the height of Gn is large.
The next step is to express in our logic the relation {(a1, b1, a2, b2): for some
k1, k2 we have b1 ∈ SGn,a1,k1 , b2 ∈ SGn,a2,k2 and k1 ≤ k2}.
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By this we can interpret a linear order with height(Gn) members. Again using
the relevant logic this suffice to interpret number theory up to this height. Working
more we can define a linear order with n elements, so can essentially find a formula
“saying” n is even (or odd).
For random graphs we have to work harder: instead of having two relations we
have two formulas; one of the complications is that their satisfaction for the relevant
pairs are not fully independent.
In [Sh:1096] we shall deal with the strong failure of the 0-1 for Case A, i.e. Gn,pα ,
(e.g. can “express” n is even) and also intend to deal with the α rational case. The
irrationality can be replaced by discarding few exceptions.
We thank the referee for helping to improve the presentation.
§ 0(B). History.
The history is non-trivial having non-trivial opaque points. I have a clear memory
of the events but vague on the exact statements and more so on the proof (and a
concise entry in my (private F-list, [Sh:F159])) that in January 1996, in a Conference
in DIMACS, Monica McArthur gave a lecture claiming that the graph Gn,α satisfies
the 0-1 law not only for first order logic (by Shelah-Spencer [ShSp:304]) but also for
a stronger logic. Joel Spencer said this can be contradicted in a way he outlined.
I thought on this and saw further things (explain to her saying more and) wrote
them in a letter to Monica and Joel. I understood that it was agreed that Monica
would write a paper with us saying more but eventually she left academia.
As the referee found out, MacArthur’s claim in [?] (DIMACS): failure of the law
in Lω∞,ω, but refers the proof to a paper in preparation with Spencer that never
appeared. She claims also that there is 0-1 law for Lk∞,ω if k = [1/α], referring again
to the paper in preparation. The later claim is not contradicted by the results of
this paper. Lynch [Lyn97], refers also to a joint paper with McArthur and Spencer
that never appeared proving that for the TC (= transitive closure) logic satisfies
the 0-1 law.
Having sent Joel (in 2011) an earlier version of this paper, his recollection of
talking to Monica was that “we hadn’t really gotten a handle on the situation”.
Discussing with Simi Haber, (December 2011) this question arised again, trying
to recollect it was not clear to me what was the logic (inductive logic? L∞,k?)
Looking at it again, I saw a proof for the logic L∞,k. No trace of the letter or
the notes mentioned above were found. The only tangible evidence, is in an entry
[Sh:F159] from my F-list. Joel declined a suggestion that Haber, he and I will deal
with it, and eventually also Haber left.
The notes on §1 are from January 2012; for §2 from Sept. 4, 2012; revised in
Nov/Dec. 2014 and expanded March 2015, June, 2015.
The intention was that it would appear in the Yurifest, commemorating Yuri
Gurevich’s 75th birthday, but it was not in a final version in time, so only a short
version (with the abstract and §(0A)) appear in the Yurifest volume, [Sh:1061].
§ 0(C). Preliminaries.
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Notation 0.1. 1) n ∈ N\{0} will be used for “Gn ∈ Kn random enough”.
2) G,H denote graphs and M,N denote more general structures = models.
3) a, b, c, d, e denote nodes of graphs or elements of structures.
4) m, k, ℓ denote natural numbers.
5) τ denotes a vocabulary, M a model with vocabulary τ = τM (see 0.1(9),(10)
below).
6) L denotes a logic, L is first order logic, so L(τ) is first order language (= set
of formulas) for the vocabulary τ . L (τ) is the language for the logic L and the
vocabulary τ .
7) LLFP is the least fix point logic, short hand LFP.
8)
(a) Let kA be the set of sequences η of length k of members of A, i.e. η =
〈a0, . . . , ak−1〉 where
∧
ℓ<k
aℓ ∈ A, so aℓ = η(ℓ).
(b) For a set u, e.g. of natural number let x¯[u] = 〈xs : s ∈ u〉,
(c) if ϕ(x¯m, y¯) ∈ L (τ) and M is a τ -model and b¯ ∈ ℓg(y¯)M and x¯m = 〈xi : i <
m〉 then ϕ(M, b¯) = {a¯ ∈ mM :M |= ϕ[a¯, b¯]}.
9) Let τgr denote the vocabulary of graphs, but we may write L(graph) or L (graph)
instead of L(τgr),L (τgr). So τgr consists of one two-place predicate R, (below
always interpreted as a symmetric irreflexive relation).
10) Let τdg denote the vocabularies of bound directed graphs, so it consists of two
two-place predicates, below always interpreted as irreflexive relations. Let τN be
the vocabulary of number theory, see 0.2(1).
11) We define the function log∗ from R≥0 to N by:
log∗(x) is 0 if x < 2
log∗(x) is log∗(log2(x)) + 1 if x ≥ 2
12) |u| is the cardinality = the number of elements of a set u.
Explanation 0.2. 1) Above recall that the vocabulary of the model = the structure
N, number theory, is the set of symbols {0, 1,+,×, <} where 0,1 are individual
constants (interpreted in N as the corresponding elements) and +,× are two-place
function symbols interpreted as +N,×N the two-place functions of addition and
multiplication, and < is a two-place predicate (= relation symbol) interpreted as
<N, the usual order on N.
2) In general
(A) a vocabulary is a set of predicates, individual constants and function sym-
bols each with a given arity = number of places; individual constants (like
0,1 above) are considered as 0-place function symbols
(B) a τ -model or a τ -structure M consists of:
(a) its universe, |M |, a non-empty set of elements so ‖M‖ is their number
(b) if P ∈ τ is an n-place predicate, PM is a set of n-tuples of members
of M
(c) if F ∈ T is an n-place function symbol then FM is an n-place function
from from |M | to |M |.
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Definition 0.3. Let τ be a finite vocabulary, for simplicity with predicates only
or we just consider a function as a relation. Here we use τgr, τdg only except when
we interpret.
1) We say ϕ¯ is in a (τ∗, τ)-scheme of interpretaion when : (if τ is clear from the
context we may write τ∗-scheme)
(a) ϕ¯ = 〈ϕR(x¯nτ (R)) : R ∈ τ∗ ∪ {=}〉 where nτ (R) is the arity (= number of
places) of R
(b) ϕR ∈ L(τ)
(c) ϕ=(x0, x1) is always an equivalence relation on {y : (ϕ(y, y)}; if ϕ= is
(x0 = x1) then we may omit it.
2) For a τ -model M (here a graph or diagram) and ϕ¯ as above, let N = NM,ϕ¯ be
the following structure:
(a) |N | the set of elements of N , is {a/ϕ=(M) : a ∈ M and M |= ϕ=(a, a)};
note that ϕ(M) is an equivalence relation on {a :M |= ϕ=(a, a)}
(b) if R ∈ τ has arity m then RN , the interpretation of r is {〈aℓ/ϕ=(M) : ℓ <
m :M |=
∧
ℓ<m
ϕ=(aℓ, aℓ) ∧ ϕR(a0, . . . , am−1} so a0, . . . , am−1 ∈M}.
Recall that here “for every random enough Gn” is a central notion.
Definition 0.4. 1) A 0-1 context consists of:
(a) a vocabulary τ , here just the one of graphs or double directed graphs, see
0.1(5),(9),(10)
(b) for each n,Kn is a set of τ -models with set of elements = nodes [n], in our
case graphs or double driected graphs
(c) a distribution µn on Kn, i.e. µn : Kn → [0, 1]R satisfying Σ{µn(G) : G ∈
Kn} = 1
(d) the random structure is called Gn = Gµn and we tend to speak on Gµn
rather than on the context.
2) For a given 0-1 context, let “for every random enough Gn we have Gn |= ψ, i.e.
G satisfies ψ” and “if Gn is random enough then ψ”, etc. means that the sequence
〈Prob(Gn |= ψ) : n ∈ N〉 converge to 1; of course, Prob(Gn |= ψ) = Σ{µn(G) : G ∈
Kn and G |= ψ}.
3) For p¯ = 〈pn = p(n) : n〉 a sequence of probabilities, Gn,p¯ is the case Kn = graphs
on [n] and we draw the edges independently
(a) with probability p when p¯ is constantly p, e.g. 12 , and
(b) with probability p(n) or pn when p is a function from N to [0, 1]R.
Below we add the second context because for it the proof is more transparent.
Context 0.5. 1) Case A:
(a) a ∈ (0, 1) is irrational
(b) pn = 1/n
α.
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2) Case B:
α¯∗ = (α∗1, α
∗
2) where α
∗
1, α
∗
2 ∈ (0, 1/4) are irrational numbers, (natural to add
linearly independent over Q) hence 0 < α∗1 < α
∗
2 < α
∗
2 +α
∗
2 < 1/2 and let α
∗
0 = α
∗
1.
Definition 0.6. For Case A:
1) Let K1 :=
⋃
n
K1n where we let K
1
n be the set of graphs G on [n] = {1, . . . , n} so
RG ⊆ {{i, j} : i 6= j ∈ [n]}.
2) For α ∈ (0, 1)R let Gn = Gn;α be the random graph on [n] with the probability
of an edge being 1/nα and the drawing of the edges being independent.
3) Let µn = µn;α be the corresponding distribution on K
1
n; so µn : K
1
n → [0, 1]R
and 1 = Σ{µn(M) :M ∈ Kn}, in fact, µn(G) = (1/nα)|R
G| × (1− 1/nα)(
n
2)−|R
G|.
Convention 0.7. Writing Kn means we intend K
1
n or K
2
n (see below), similarly
Gn is Gn,α if Case A and Gn,α¯ if Case B and similarly K is K
1 or K2.
The more transparent related case is the following
Definition 0.8. On Case B, for Gn;α¯:
1) Recall τdg is the vocabulary {R1, R2} intended to be two directed graph relations.
2) Let K2 =
⋃
n
K2n where we let K
2
n = {G : G = ([n], R
G
1 , R
G
2 ) satisfying ([n], R
G
ℓ ) is
a directed graph for ℓ = 1, 2; we may write Rℓ instead of R
G
ℓ when G is clear from
the context}. We assume2 irreflexivity, i.e. (a, a) /∈ RGℓ but allow (a, b), (b, a) ∈ R
G
ℓ .
3) For reals α1 < α2 from (0,
1
4 )R, say from 0.5(2) so α¯ = (α1, α2) let α(ℓ) = αℓ; let
the random model Gn;α¯ = ([n], R1, R2) = ([n], R
Gn;α¯
1 , R
Gn;α¯
2 ) with R1, R2 irreflexive
relations be drawn as follows:
(a) for each a 6= b, we draw a truth value for R2(a, b) with probability
1
n1−α2
for yes
(b) for each a 6= b, we draw a truth value for R1(a, b) with probability
1
n1+α1
for yes
(c) those drawings are independent.
4) We define the distribution µn;α¯ as follows:
(a) µn = µn;α¯ = µn;α1,α2 is the following distributions on K
2
n:
• µn(G) = µ2n;α2([n], R
G
1 )) · µ
2
n;−α1([n], R
G
2 )) where
• µ2n;α([n], R) = (
1
n1−α )
|RG| · (1− 1n1−α )
n(n−1)−|RG|
(b) Gn = Gn;α¯ = Gn;α1,α2 denote a random enough G ∈ K
2
n for µn;α¯ so n is
large enough.
Observation 0.9. For random enough (recalling 0.4(2)) Gn = Gn;α¯ = Gn;α1,α2 :
(a) For a ∈ [n], the expected value of the R2-valency of a, that is, |{b : aRG2 b}|
is (n− 1) · 1
n1−α(2)
∼ nα(2);
(b) for every random enough Gn;α¯ for every a ∈ [n] this number is close enough
to nα(1), e.g.
2We may change the definition of K2n by requiring R
G
1
∩ RG
2
= ∅, this makes little difference.
We could further demand Rℓ is asymmetric, i.e. (a, b) ∈ R
G
ℓ ⇒ (b, a) /∈ R
G
0
, again this makes
little difference.
8 SAHARON SHELAH
•2 for some ε ∈ (0, α1)R, the probability of the difference being ≥ nα(1)(1−ε)
for at least one a ∈ [n], goes to zero with n
(c) the expected number of R1-edges is n(n − 1)/n+(1+α1) ∼ n1−α1 hence the
expected value of |{a : aR1b for some b}| is close to it
(d) for every random enough Gn,α¯ the two numbers in (c) are close enough to
n1−α1 (similarly to (b)).
Remark 0.10. 1) For K2, this is a parallel of Claim 1.2 for K1.
2) Note that the Clause (a) does not imply clause (b) in 0.9 because a priori the
variance may be too large.
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§ 1. On the logic L∞,k
As the proof for L∞,k is simpler and more transparent than for LFP, we shall
explain it.
First, we try to define and then explain the logic L∞,k for k a finite number.
For a vocabulary τ , we define the set L∞,k(τ) of formulas as the closure of the
set of atomic formulas under some operation similarly to first order logic, but:
• we restrict ourselves to formulas having < k free variables
• we allow arbitrary conjunctions and disjunctions (that is even infinite3 ones)
• as in first order logic we allow negation ¬ϕ and existential quantifier (on
one variable) ∃xϕ(x, y¯).
So any formula in L∞,k not just have only < k free variables but also every sub-
formula has.
It may be helpful to recall the standard game which express equivalence. Recall
(0.3(1)) that for transparency we assume the vocabulary below has only predicates
and is finite.
⊞ we say F is an (M1,M2) − L∞,k-equivalence witness when for some vo-
cabulary τ with predicates only
(a) M1,M2 are τ -models
(b) F is a non-empty set of partial isomorphisms from M1 to M2
(c) if f ∈ F then |dom(f)| < k
(d) if f ∈ F , A ⊆ dom(f), |A| + 1 < k, ι ∈ {1, 2} and aι ∈ Mι then
there is g such that g ∈ F , f↾A ⊆ g and ι = 1 ⇒ aι ∈ dom(g) and
ι = 2⇒ aι ∈ rang(g).
Now
⊕1 for M1,M2 as in (a) of ⊞ above, the following are equivalent:
(a) M1,M2 are L∞,k-equivalent, i.e. for every sentence ψ ∈ L∞,k(τ), i.e.
a formula with no free variables, M1 |= ψ ⇔M2 |= ψ
(b) there is an (M1,M2)− L∞,k-equivalence witness F , i.e. as in ⊞.
Also
⊕2 for M1,M2,F as in ⊞ above we have
(c) if k < k, a0, . . . , ak−1 ∈ M1 and g ∈ F and {aℓ : ℓ < k} ⊆ dom(g)
then for every formula ϕ(x0, . . . , xk−1) ∈ L∞,k(τ) we have
M1 |= ϕ[a0, . . . , ak−1]⇔M2 |= ϕ[g(a0), . . . , g(ak−1)].
∗ ∗ ∗
Having explained the logic, how can we prove for it the failure of the 0-1 law?
Consider Case B where we have two kinds of edges, R1 and R2. Consider η a
sequence from k{1, 2}, see 0.1(11) and a 6= b. There may be (η, 0, k)-pre-paths from
3As we consider only finite models, countable conjunctions and injunctions are enough.
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a to b in G, see Definition 1.6, i.e. a = a0, a1, . . . , ak = b such that (aℓ, aℓ+1) is an
Rη(ℓ)-edge for ℓ < k.
Now depending on η there may be many such pre-paths or few. If η is constantly
2 and k > 1/α∗2 then there are many such pre-paths - as fixing a in Gn,α¯∗ the
expected number of b’s for which there is pre-(η, 0, k)-paths from a to b is 1 for
k = 0, is ≈ nα
∗
2 for k = 1 is ≈ n2α
∗
2 for k = 2, etc., so for k > 1/α∗2 it is every
b ∈ Gn; not helpful. If η is constantly 1, there are few such pre-paths and they are
all short, even ≤ k for any random enough Gn, when 1 < α∗1k, not helpful.
But we may choose a “Goldilock’s” η, that is, such that for every initial segment
of η the expected number is not too large and not too small. This means that for
some a for every k′ ≤ k for some b there is such a pre-path but not too many. We
need more so that we can define by a formula from L∞,k the set SGn,a,k′ := {b:
there is such pre-path from a to b of length k′ but not a shorter pre-path} and it is
6= ∅; moreover we can define the natural order on the set {SGn,a,k : k ≤ n}. Fact
1.4 below indicates what kind of η’s we need, and we use it proving 1.8; however
in later sections, because we have to estimate the probabilities, we shall use only a
closely related definition.
Hypothesis 1.1. 1) Case A of 0.5 holds or Case B there holds.
2)
(a) for case A: α∗ℓ , ϕℓ(x, y), n
∗
ℓ for ℓ = 0, 1, 2 will be as in Claim 1.2 below
(b) for case B: α∗1, α
∗
2 are as in 0.5 and ϕℓ(x, y) = Rℓ(x, y) for ℓ = 1, 2 and let
α∗0 = α
∗
1, ϕ0(x, y) = ϕ1(x, y)
(c) let ϕ¯ = 〈ϕℓ(x, y) : ℓ = 0, 1, 2〉.
Claim 1.2. Assume we are in Case A. There are α∗ℓ , ϕℓ(x, y) and γ
∗
ℓ for ℓ = 0, 1, 2
such that:
(a) 0 < α∗1 < α
∗
0 < α
∗
2 < α
∗
2 + α
∗
2 are reals with α
∗
ℓ ∈ (0, 1/4)R and γ
∗
ℓ ∈ R>0
(b) ϕℓ(x, y) are first order formulas (in the vocabulary of graphs) even existen-
tial positive formulas such that ϕℓ(x, y) ⊢ x 6= y for random enough Gn;α¯
(c) if Gn;α¯ is random enough then for every a ∈ Gn;α¯ the set ϕ2(Gn;α¯, a) has
≈ γ∗ℓ n
α∗2 elements, i.e. for some ε ∈ (0, 1)R, if Gn;α¯ is random enough,
then for every a ∈ [n], the number of members of ϕ1(Gn;α¯, a) belongs to the
interval (γ∗ℓ n
α∗2 − nα
∗
2(1−ε), γ∗2n
α∗2 + nα
∗
2(1−ε))
(d) if ℓ = 0, 1 and Gn;α¯ is random enough then {a ∈ [n] : ϕℓ(Gn;α¯, a) 6= ∅} has
≈ γ∗ℓ n/n
α∗ℓ members.
Remark 1.3. We shall use not just the statements but also the proofs of 1.2, 1.4.
Proof. Also here we shall use freely the analysis of Gn;α for α ∈ (0, 1)R irrational
(see, e.g. [AS08]).
Let m∗2, n
∗
2 be such that:
(a) n∗2 is large enough
(b) m∗2 ≤
(
n∗2
2
)
(c) α∗2 := (n
∗
2 − 1)− αm
∗
2 is positive but, e.g. <
1
12 .
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As α ∈ (0, 1)R is irrational we can find such m∗2, n
∗
2. Let H
∗
2 be a random enough
graph on [n∗2] with m
∗
2 edges such that (1, 2) /∈ R
H∗2 . (Note that this “random
enough” is just used for the existence proof).
We choose n∗1,m
∗
1, H
∗
1 similarly except that −α
∗
1 := n
∗
1−1−αm
∗
1 is negative with
value close enough, e.g. to −α∗2/3. Lastly, we choose n
∗
0,m
∗
0, H
∗
0 similarly except
that −α∗0 = n
∗
0 − 1− αm
∗
6 is negative and α
∗
0 ∈ (α
∗
1, α
∗
2).
For ℓ = 1, 2 let ϕℓ(x, y) = (∃ . . . xi . . .)i∈[n∗ℓ ](x = x1 ∧ y = x2 ∧
∧
{xiRxj : i, j ∈
[m∗ℓ ] satisfies iR
H∗ℓ j}) ∧
∧
{xi 6= xj : i 6= j ∈ [n∗ℓ ]}.
Now check clauses (a)-(d). Clearly α∗1, α
∗
2 satisfy clause (a) and ϕ1, ϕ2 are as in
clause (b).
For ℓ = 1, 2, let γ∗ℓ = 1. So for any n large enough compared to n
∗
1, n
∗
2 and
a1 6= a2 ∈ [n], the set F := {f : f is a one-to-one function from [n∗2] to [n] such
that f(1) = a1, f(2) = a2} has
∏
i<n∗2−2
(n− 2− i) ∼ nn
∗
2−2 members.
For each f ∈ F the probability of the event Ef = “f maps every edge of H∗2
to an edge of Gn,α” is (
1
nα )
m∗2 so the expected value of {f ∈ F : Ef occurs} is
≈ nn
∗
2−αm
∗
2−2 = 1
n1−α
∗
2
. Clearly as in 0.9 the expected value is as required in clause
(c) and by the well known analysis of Gnα (see, e.g. [AS08]), clause (c) holds and
see more in §4.
Clause (d) is proved similarly. 1.2
Fact 1.4. There is a sequence η ∈ N{1, 2} such that: for every n > 0,
γn = |(η↾n)−1{2}|α∗2 − |(η↾n)
−1{1}|α∗1 belongs
4 to [α∗2 − α
∗
1, α
∗
2 + α
∗
2]R.
Proof. We choose η(n) by induction on n. Let η(n) be 2 if γn ≤ α∗2, e.g. n = 0 and
η(n) be 1 if γn > α
∗
2.
Easily η is as required. 1.4
Claim 1.5. 1) If η is as in 1.4 then for any m and every random enough Gn,
there is an (η,m)-path in Gn, see below.
2) Moreover, also there is an (η, ε⌊log(n)⌋-path and even an (η, ⌊nε⌋)-path for ap-
propriate ε ∈ R>0.
Proof. As in [AS08] on Gn,1/nα and see more in §3. 1.5
Definition 1.6. 1) A sequence a¯ = 〈aℓ : ℓ ∈ [m1,m2]〉 of nodes, that is, of members
of G ∈ Kn is called a pre-(ν,m1,m2)-path, if m1 = 0 we may omit it, when :
(a) ν is a sequence of length ≥ m2 and i < ℓg(ν)⇒ ν(i) ∈ {1, 2}
(b) if ℓ ∈ {m1,m1 + 1, . . . ,m2 − 1} then G |= ϕν(ℓ)(aℓ, aℓ+1).
2) Above we say “(ν,m1,m2)-path” when in addition:
(c) if m1 ≤ ℓ1 < ℓ2 ≤ m2 and 〈a
′
ℓ : ℓ ∈ [m1, ℓ2)〉 is a pre-(ν,m1, ℓ2)-path then
a′m1 = am1 ∧ a
′
ℓ2
= aℓ2 ⇒ a
′
ℓ1
= aℓ1
(d) if m1 ≤ ℓ1 < ℓ2 ≤ m2 then aℓ1 6= aℓ2 .
3) We say “a¯ is a (pre)-(ν,m1,m2)-path from a to b” when in addition am1 =
a ∧ am2 = b.
4Can and will use also other intervals and similar sequences
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Remark 1.7. 1) Note that if 〈aℓ : ℓ ≤ m〉 is a pre-(ν,m)-path, it is possible that
ℓ1 + 1 < ℓ2 ≤ m and aℓ1 = aℓ2 . For a (ν,m)-path this is impossible.
2) In 1.6(2)(c), really the case ℓ2 = m2 suffice.
3) We use the “log(n)” Case in 1.5(2), but having log(log(n)) and even much less
has no real affect on the proof.
Conclusion 1.8. Let k ≥ max{n∗0, n
∗
1, n
∗
2} then Gn fails the 0-1 law for L∞,k.
Remark 1.9. 1) Note that if 〈aℓ : ℓ ≤ m〉 is a pre-(ν,m)-path, it is possible that
ℓ1 + 1 < ℓ2 ≤ m and aℓ1 = aℓ2 . For a (ν,m)-path this is impossible.
2) In 1.6(2)(c), really the case ℓ2 = m2 suffice.
3) We use the “log(n)” case in 1.5(2), but having log log(n) and even much less has
no real affect on the proof.
Note that we rely on 1.5(2) but we prove more in §3.
Proof. For a finite graph G and η as in 1.4 or any η ∈ N{1, 2} let lengthη(G) be the
maximal m such that there is an (η,m)-path in G.
Now consider the statement
⊕ there is a sentence ψm = ψη,m ∈ L∞,k(τgr) such that for a finite graph
G,G |= ψm iff there is an (η,m)-path in G.
Why ⊕ is enough? Because then we let
ψ =
∨
{(ψm ∧ ¬ψm+1) : m ≥ 10 and (log∗(m) is even)}
where log∗(m) is essentially the inverse of the tower function, see 0.1(3). Note that
using 1.4, 1.5(2), of course, we should be able to say much more.
Why ⊕ is true? First, we define the formula ψm1,m2(x, y) for m1 ≤ m2 by
induction on m2 −m1 as follows:
(∗)1 if m1 = m2 it is x = y
(∗)2 if m1 < m2 it is (∃x1)[ϕη(m1)(x, x1) ∧ ψm1+1,m2(x1, y)].
So clearly
(∗)3 if G ∈ Kn and a, b ∈ [n] thenG |= ψm1,m2(a, b) iff there is a pre-(η,m1,m2)-
path from a to b.
Second, we define ψ′m2(x, y) as ψ0,m2(x, y)∧
∧
ℓ1<ℓ2≤m2
¬(∃z′1, z
′′
1 , z2)[z
′
1 6= z
′′
2∧ψ0,ℓ1(x, z
′
1)∧
ψ0,ℓ1(x, z
′′
1 ) ∧ ψℓ1,ℓ2(z
′
1, z2) ∧ ψℓ1,ℓ2(z
′′
1 , z2) ∧ ψℓ2,m2(z2, y)].
This just formalizes 1.6(2)(c) so
(∗)4 G |= ψ′m2(a, b) iff there is an (η,m2)-path from a to b.
As said above this is enough. Note that complicating the sentence we may weaken
the demand on Gn. 1.8
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§ 2. The LFP Logic
In this section we try to interpret an initial segment of number theory in a
random enough G ∈ Kn, i.e. with set of nodes [n]. In Definition 2.2 for G ∈ Kn
and a ∈ G we define a model MG,a. Now in M ∈ MG,a∗ , the equivalence classes
of EM represent natural numbers. Concentrating on Case B, starting with {a∗}
as the first equivalence class, usually its set of R2-neighbors will be the second
equivalence class. Generally, if for an equivalence class a/EM we let the next one
be the set suc(a/EM ) = {b ∈ G : R2(a
′, b) for some a′ ∈ a/EM}, then we expect
that suc(A/EM ) has ≈ |a/EM |·nα2 members. So if we continue in this way, shortly
we get the equivalence classes cover essentially all the nodes of G. Hence we try
to sometimes use the R1-neighbors instead of the R2-neighbors, but when? For
L∞,k(τ∗) we can decide a priori, e.g.use η as in 1.4 and the proof of 1.8 so that the
expected number will be small. But for LFP logic this is not clear, so we just say:
use the R1-neighbors if there is at least one and the R2-neighbors otherwise, so this
is close to what is done in 1.4, 1.5, 1.8 but not the same.
For case A we use ϕℓ-neighbors instead of Rℓ-neighbors for ℓ = 1, 2 except that
the question on existence is for ϕ0-neighbors.
How do we from equivalence relations and the successor relation re-construct
the initial segment of number theory? This is exactly the power of definition by
induction.
Naturally we need just
⊞ letting height(G) be the maximal number of EM -equivalence classes for
M ∈MG,a, a ∈ G, we have:
(∗) for every m, for every random enough Gn,m ≤ height(G), more-
over letting f : N → N be f(n) = log∗(n) for every random enough
Gn, f(n) ≤ height(Gn).
For failure of 0-1 laws, ⊞ is enough, but we may wish to prove a stronger version,
say finding a sentence ψ which for every random enough Gn, Gn satisfies ψ iff n is
even.
We intend to return to it elsewhere; but for now note that for a set A ⊆ G we
can define (R is R2 for Case B, ϕ2 for Case A) cℓGn(A) = {b : b ∈ A or b ∈ G\A
but for no c ∈ G\A\{a} do we have (∀x ∈ A)[R(x, c) ≡ R(x, b)]}. Now from a
definition of a linear order on A we can derive one on cℓGn(A). We can replace R
by any formula ϕ(x, y). Now in our context, if we know that, with parameters, we
define such A of size ≈ nε for appropriate ε then we can define a linear order on
[n]; why there is such A? because if M ∈MG,a∗ and k is not too large then there
is b ∈M, lev(b,M) = k such that there is a unique maximal <M2 -path from a∗ to b.
For L∞,k this is much easier.
Context 2.1. (A) or (B):
(A) (case A of 0.5) the vocabulary τ∗ is τgr, the one for the class of graphs,
ϕℓ(x, y), ℓ = 0, 1, 2 are as in 1.2 so ∈ L(τ∗) and α¯
∗ = (α∗0, α
∗
1, α
∗
2), is as
there, G = Gn = Gn;α,Kn = K
1
n as in Definition 1.4,
(B) (case B of 0.5) τ∗ = τdg = {R1, R2},Kn = K2n and α¯
∗ = (α∗1, α
∗
2) are as in
0.5(2) and Gn = Gn;α¯∗ and ϕℓ(x, y) = xRℓy for ℓ = 1, 2, with Gn,K
2
n as in
Definition 0.8 and let α∗0 = α
∗
1, ϕ0(x, y) = ϕ1(x, y).
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Definition 2.2. For G ∈ Kn and a∗ ∈ G we define M = M(G, a∗) = MG,a∗ as
the set of τ1-structures of M such that (the vocabulary τ1 is defined implicitly):
(A) (a) the universe of M is PM ⊆ [n]
(b) cM∗ = a∗, so c∗ is an individual constant from τ1
(c) EM is an equivalence relation on M
(d) <1 is a linear order on P
M/EM , i.e.
(α) a1E
Ma2 ∧ b1EM b2 ∧ a1 <M1 b1 ⇒ a2 <
M
1 b2
(β) for every a, b ∈ PM exactly one of the following holds: a <M1
b, b <M1 a and aE
M b
(e) <M2 is a partial order included in <
M
1
(f) (α) a∗/E
M is a singleton and a∗ is <
M
2 -minimal, i.e. b ∈M\{a∗} ⇒
a <M2 b
(β) if a <M1 b <
M
1 c and a <
M
2 c then for some b
′ ∈ b/EM we have
a <M2 b
′ <M2 c
(γ) if a, b ∈ M and b/EM is the immediate successor of a/EM (by
<M1 ) then for some a
′ ∈ a/EM , we have a′ <M2 b
(g) if b ∈ M is a <M2 -immediate successor of a ∈ M (i.e. a <
M
2 b and
¬(∃y)(a <2 y <2 b), equivalently, ¬(∃y)(a <1 y <1 b)) then for some
ι ∈ {1, 2} we have G |= ϕι[a, b]
(h) P0, P1, P2 = P+, P3 = P×, P4 = P< are predicates (of τ1) with 1,1,3,3,2
places respectively such that using the definitions in clauses (B)(a),(b),(c)
below, PMℓ are defined in clauses (B)(d) below
(B) (a) for a ∈M, lev(a,M) is the maximal k such that there are a0 <M1 a
M
1 <
. . . <M1 ak = a; so necessarily a0 = a∗
(b) height(M) = max{lev(a,M) : a ∈M}
(c) for k < height(M) let ι = ι(k,M) ∈ {1, 2} be such that if b is a <M2 -
immediate successor of a and k = lev(a,M) then G |= ϕι[a, b], in the
unlikely case both ι = 1 and ι = 2 are as required we use ι = 1
(d) (α) PM0 = {a∗}
(β) PM1 = {a ∈M : lev(a,M) = 1}
(γ) PM2 = {(a, b, c) : a, b, c ∈ M and N |= “lev(a,M) + lev(b,M) =
lev(c,M)”}
(δ) PM3 = {(a, b, c) : a, b, c ∈ M and N |= “lev(a,M) × lev(b,M) =
lev(c,M)”}
(ε) PM4 = {(a, b) : N |= “lev(a,M) < lev(a,N)”}.
Definition 2.3. 1) Let ι ∈ {1, 2}.
We say N is the ι-successor of M in MG,a when for some k
(a) M,N ∈MG,a so G ∈ Kn for some n
(b) M ⊆ N as models so M = N↾|M |, recalling |M | is the set of elements of
M
(c) k = height(M) and height(N) = k + 1
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(d) b ∈ N\M iff lev(b,N) = k + 1 iff b ∈ G\M and for some5 a ∈ M we have
lev(a,M) = k and G |= ϕι[a, b].
2) We may omit ι above when : ι = 1 iff (∗) holds where:
(∗) there is c ∈M such that lev(c,M) = k = height(G) and for some b ∈ G\M
we have G |= ϕ0[b, c]; yes not ϕ1! but for case B there is no difference.
3) For a sentence ψ in the vocabulary τ1 ∪ τ∗, (see 2.1, 2.2), for M,N ∈MG,a, we
say N is the ψ-successor of M when for some ι ∈ {1, 2}, N is the ι-successor of M
and (G,M) |= ψ ⇔ (ι = 1).
4) For G ∈ Kn, a∗ ∈ G and M ∈MG,a∗ we define NM,a∗ as the following structure
N with the vocabulary of number theory:
(a) set of elements {a/EM : a ∈M}
(b) 0N = a∗/E
M = PN0
(c) 1N = PM1
(d) if aℓ = aℓ/E
M ∈ N, aℓ ∈M for ℓ = 1, 2, 3 then
(α) N |= “a1 + a2 = a3” iff (a1, a2, a3) ∈ PM2
(β) N |= “a1 × a2 = a3” iff (a1, a2, a3) ∈ PM3
(γ) N |= “a1 < a2” iff (a1, a2) ∈ PM4 .
Claim 2.4. 1) If ι, G,M, a are as in 2.3(1) then there is at most one ι-successor
N of M in MG,a.
1A) For some ψ∗ ∈ L(τ1∪τ∗), being a ψ∗-successor is equivalent to being a successor.
2) For a given G ∈ Kn, a ∈ G,M ∈MG,a and ψ ∈ L(τ1 ∪ τ∗) there is at most one
ψ-successor N of M in MG,a.
3) For G ∈ Kn and a ∈ G there is one and only one sequence 〈Mk = Mk,a : k ≤
kG,a〉 such that:
(a) Mk ∈MG,a
(b) M0 has universe {a}
(c) Mk+1 is the successor of Mk in MG,a, recall 2.3(2)
(d) if k = kG,a then there is no N ∈ MG,a which is the successor of Mk in
MG,a
3A) Above NMk,a is isomorphic to N↾{0, . . . , k}. Also for every sentence ψ ∈ L or
even ∈ LLFP in the vocabulary of number theory there is a sentence ϕ ∈ LLFP(τ∗)
such that NMk,a |= ψ ⇒Mk,a |= ϕ; of course, ϕ depends on ψ but not on G, a (and
k).
4) In the LFP logic for τ∗, we can find a sequence ϕ¯ of formulas with
6 variable
x0, . . . , y such that: for any G ∈ Kn and a ∈ G, the sequence ϕ¯ substituting y by a
defines M = MG,a which is Mk,a for k = kG,a,ψ from part (3).
4A) For ψ as in 2.3(3), i.e. ψ ∈ L(τ1∪τ∗) , a sentence, the parallel of 2.4(3),(4),(5)
holds for “ψ-successor”, (so we should write MG,a,ψ instead MG,a).
5No real harm to demand here (and in 2.2) ”unique”
6The variable y stands for the parameters a; instead we may define in 2.3 one modelMk coding
all Ma,ℓ ∈MG,a for ℓ ≤ k, a ∈ G.
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5) Letting height(G) = max{height(MG,a) : a ∈ G}, in LFP logic there is ϕ∗(x)
such that G |= ϕ∗(a) iff a ∈ G and height(MG,a) = height(G) iff for every a1 ∈
G, height(MG,a1) ≤ height(MG,a).
6) For any sentence ψ in the vocabulary of number theory (in first order or LFP
logic) there is a sentence ϕ in induction logic for τ∗ (recallng 2.1) such that for any
G,G |= ϕ iff N↾{0, . . . , height(G)} |= ψ.
Proof. 1) Read the Definition 2.3(1).
1A) Read 2.3(2).
2) Read 2.3(3) and recall part (1).
3) We choose Mk and prove its uniqueness by induction on k till we are stuck.
Recalling 2.4(3)(d) we are done.
3A) Easy.
4),4A) Should be clear.
5) We can express by induction when “lev(b1,MG,a1) ≤ lev(b2,MG,a2)”.
6) Should be clear but we elaborate.
Recall the formula ϕ∗(x) ∈ LLFP(τ∗) from 2.4(5). By the choice of ϕ∗ necessarily
for some a∗, Gn |= ϕ∗[a∗] (as in a finite non-empty set of natural numbers there is
a maximal member) so height(a∗, Gn) = height(Gn).
Now for a given ψ, let ϕ ∈ LLFP(τ∗) say: for some (equivalently every) a ∈ Gn
such that Gn |= ϕ∗(a), the model NGn,an defined in 2.3(4), which is isomorphic to
N↾{0, . . . , height(a,MGn,an)}, see 2.4(3A), satisfies ψ. 2.4
Conclusion 2.5. We have “Gn fail the 0-1 law for the LFP logic, moreover for
some ϕ ∈ Lind(τ∗) we have Prob(Gn |= ϕ) has lim− sup = 1 and lim inf = 0”.
Proof. Should be clear by the above, in particular 2.4(6), see 3.3, 3.4(2) for details
on the probabilistic estimate needed for 1.5(2) on which we rely. But we elaborate.
Note that just the following is not sufficient:
(∗)1 some ϕ¯,m satisfies
(a) ϕ¯ an interpretation scheme, see 0.3
(b) m is a function from the class of finite graphs to N, depending on the
isomorphism type only
(c) for every m for every random enough Gn,m(Gn) ≥ m
(d) for random enoughGn, ϕ¯ defines an isomorphic copy ofN↾{0, . . . ,m(Gn)}.
However it is enough if we add, e.g.
(∗)2 m(Gn) ≥ log2(log2(n)).
Why it is enough? Let ψ be a first order sentence in the vocabulary such that
N↾{0, . . . , k} |= ϕ iff log∗(k) belong to {10n+ ℓ : ℓ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and n ∈ N}.
Now use the interpretation ϕ¯, i.e. we use 2.4(6) in our case.
Why (∗)1 + (∗)2 holds: By 3.3, 3.4(1) and 2.4(3A). 2.5
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§ 3. Revisiting induction
As discussed in §2, we need to prove that for random enough Gn, height(Gn) is
large enough, equivalently, for some a ∈ Gn (we shall prove that even for most),
height(a,Gn) is large enough. For this a more detailed specific statement is proved
- see (∗) in the proof of 3.3. That is, we prove that for most a ∈ Gn (for random
enough Gn): on the one hand MG,a,=k is not too large, and, on the other hand, is
not empty; and for Case A, even not too small. The computation naturally depends
on what ηG,a is, see 3.2(3), this is a delicate point.
For Case B, things are simpler. For each k we ask if there is an R1-edge out of
MG,a,=k to G\MG,a,k. If there is, clearly MG,a,=k+1 will be quite small but not
empty. If not, then necessarily MG,a,=k has ≤ nα
∗
2−ζ members hence the number
of R2-neighbors of members of MG,a,=k cannot be too large (well < n
α∗2nα
∗
2 ) so we
are done.
Case A seems harder, so we simplify considering only small enough k, see 3.4,
hence we can consider all possible η’s of length k, that is, summing the probability
of the “undesirable” events on all of them; so if each has small enough probability,
even the unions of all those events has small enough probability. Now we divide
the η’s to those which are “reasonable candidates to be ηGn,a” and those which are
not. For the former η’s, for almost all a ∈ Gn there is a pre-(η, 0, k∗)-path starting
with a. So it is enough to prove that for almost all a ∈ Gn, ηG,a↾k∗ is one of those
former η’s where k∗ is the relevant large enough height, e.g. ≥ ⌊log2(log2(n))⌋. For
this it is enough to prove that the other η’s cannot occur and this is what we do.
We in this section fulfill promises from §2 (and §1).
Context 3.1. As in 2.1.
Below we shall use
Definition 3.2. 1) For G ∈ Kn we define Mk(a,G) = MG,a,k by induction as in
2.4(3) for ψ = ψ∗ from 2.4(1A) and also k = kG,a as there and height(G) as in
2.4(6).
2) Let MG,a,=k = MG,a,k\ ∪ {MG,a,m : m < k} and similarly MG,a,<k.
3) Let η = ηG,a be the following sequence of length kG,a: if ℓ < kG,ℓ, then η(ℓ) =
ι(ℓ,MG,a) ∈ {1, 2} from Definition 2.2(B)(c).
Claim 3.3. For small enough ε ∈ (0, 1)R, for random enough Gn, for some a ∈
[n], kGn,a ≥ k
∗ = ⌊nε⌋ in case B and kGn,a ≥ ⌊log(log(n))⌋ in case A.
Remark 3.4. It would be nice to use an η ∈ N{1, 2} defined similarly to 1.4, say such
that γn ∈ [α∗0, α
∗
2 +α
∗
2], but this is not clear. In case B, in the proof the problem is
that the γn-s from 1.4 may be very near to α
∗
0. Also the parallel problem for case
A is that the answer to the question asked there is near the critical stage, so we are
not almost sure about the answer.
Proof. For case A, we presently prove it, e.g. for k∗ = ⌊log2(log2 n)⌋ and for Case
B, ⌊nε⌋, an overkill, but this suffices for the failure of the 0-1 law. We intend to fill
the general case elsewhere. Actually for any ε ∈ (0, 1)R we can get k∗ = ⌊n1−ε⌋.
Let ζ ∈ (0, 1)R be small enough and k∗ be as above.
Clearly it is enough to prove:
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(∗) if a ∈ [n] and k < k∗ then the probability that at least one of the following
(i)a,k, (ii)a,k, (iii)a,k fails (assuming ℓ < k ⇒ (i)a,ℓ∧(ii)a,ℓ) is small enough;
< 1k log(n) suffices, being <
1
kni for each i for large enough n is natural)
(i)a,k k ≤ kGn,a
(ii)a,k MGn,a=k has ≤ n
α∗2+α
∗
2 elements
(iii)a,k MGn,a,k, (noting that (i)a,k implies MGn,ℓ,k 6= ∅) has
≥ nα
∗
0−ζ elements 7 except when k = 0, not need for Case B.
Why does (∗) hold?
Case 1 Case B of the Context 2.1 and Definition 0.8
We are given n ≥ 1 and a ∈ [n]; we draw the edges in k stages so by induction
on k. For k = 0 draw the edges starting with a (of both kinds, an overkill), i.e. for
ι ∈ {1, 2} the truth value of Rι(a, b) for every b ∈ [n]\{a}, hence we can compute
M1(a,G).
The induction hypothesis on stage k is that 〈MG,a,i : i ≤ k〉 have been computed
and we have drawn the truth value of Rι(c, b) for b ∈ ∪{MG,a,i : i < k} and
c ∈ [n]\{b}. If k < k∗ we now draw the edges Rι(b, c) for b ∈ MG,a,=k and any
c 6= b; actually the c ∈ MG,i,k are irrelevant and so we can compute MG,a,k+1.
Now we ask: if (i)a,m + (ii)a,m holds for m ≤ k what is the probability that
(i)a,k+1+(ii)a,k+1? (recalling (iii)a,k+1 is irrelevant), i.e., is it small enough? This
is easy and as required.
In details, we ask
Question: Are there c ∈ [n]\MG,a,k and b ∈MG,a,=k such that (b, c) ∈ RG1 ?
First note
(∗) if |MG,a,=k| ≥ nα
∗
2−ζ then the probability that the answer is no is < 1/2n.
[Why? We have MG,a,=k × ([n]\MG,a,k) independent drawings so their number is
≥ nα
∗
2−ζn/2, each with probability 1
n1+α
∗
1
of success and (1 + α∗2 − ζ)− (1 + α
∗
1) =
α∗2 − ζ − α
∗
1 > 0 so the probability of the no answer is (1 −
1
n1+α
∗
1
)n
(1+α∗2−ζ) ∼
1/e(n
α∗2−ζ−α
∗
1)/2); clearly more than enough.]
By (∗) it suffices to deal with the following two possibilities.
Possibility 1: The answer is yes.
In this case MG,a,k+1 is well defined and ι(k,MG,a,k) = 1,MG,a,=k+1 = {c : c ∈
G\MG,a,k and (b, c) ∈ RG1 for some b ∈MG,a=k}. Now for each c ∈ [n]\MG,a,k and
b ∈ MG,a,=k the probability of (c, b) ∈ RG1 is
1
n1+α
∗
1
hence by the independence of
the drawing, recalling |MG,a,=k| ≤ nα
∗
2+α
∗
2 the probability of |MG,a,=k+1| ≥ nα
∗
2+α
∗
2
is negligible, e.g. < 2n so can be ignored. Also by the possibility we are in,
MG,a,=k+1 6= ∅.
Possibility 2: The answer is no and |MG,a,=k| ≤ nα
∗
2−ζ .
This is easy, too, recalling that almost surely for every a′ ∈ G the number of
R2-neighbors in the interval [n
α∗2 −nα
∗
2(1−ζ), nα
∗
2 +nα
∗
2(1−ζ)] and so the probability
that MG,a,=k+1 is too large is negligible.
Case 2: Case A of the context 2.1
7We can use ≥ nα
∗
2−α
∗
0−ζ
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Here it helps to use “ϕ0, ϕ1 are distinct”.
Now it suffices to prove:
(∗)1 for random enough Gn, for
8 a ∈M , the following has negligible probability
of failure: (i)a,k, (ii)a,k, (iii)a,k.
Note that for this it seems more transparent to9 assume k < log2(log2(n)) and to
translate (∗)1 to statement on paths.
(∗)2 For k ≤ k∗ let
(a) Ω=k be the set of η ∈
k{1, 2} such that α(η) := |η−1{2}|·α∗2−|η
−1{1}|·
α∗1 belongs to the interval [0, α
∗
2 + α
∗
2 + ζ]
(b) Ωk be the set of η ∈ k{1, 2} such that for every ℓ < n the sequence
η↾ℓ = 〈η(0), . . . , η(ℓ− 1)〉 belongs to Ω=ℓ
(c) ∆k be the set of η ∈ k{1, 2} such that η ∈ Ω=k and even η ∈ Ωk but
α(η) ≤ α∗0 − ζ
(∗)3 recalling that ζ ∈ (0, 1)N is small enough, for any random enough Gn, for
every a ∈M the following has probability ≤ 1/nζ:
• for some k ≤ ⌊log(log(n))⌋ and η ∈ k{1, 2} at least one of the following
holds
(a)η η ∈ Ωk but there is no pre-(η, 0, k)-path in Gn starting with a
(b)η η ∈ ∆k but there is a pre-(η, 0, k + 1)-path in Gn from a
to some b ∈ Gn\{a} such that Gn |= (∃x)ϕ0(b, x).
Otherwise the proof is as in the earlier case. 3.3
Claim 3.5. Let Gn = Gn;α¯∗ , i.e. we are in Case B. For some (τN, τdn)-scheme ψ¯,
for every random enough Gn;α¯∗,ψ defines in Gn a structure isomorphic to N<n.
Proof. We make a minor change in Definition 2.3(1),(d).
Clause (d)+: We require the a ∈M is unique.
This makes no real difference above because the probability of the occurance if
even one “b with two predecessors” is small and we just need that there is one; this
makes MG,a,k smaller but not empty.
We start as in the proof of 3.3, for k∗ = ⌊nζ⌋, we use Case 1 but for stage
k we draw the truth values of Rι(b, c) only when b ∈ MG,a,=k and c ∈ [n] but
c /∈MG,a,0 ∪ . . .MG,a,k−1.
So there is b ∈ MG,a,=k∗ and there is a unique sequence 〈aℓ : ℓ ≤ k∗〉, a0 =
a, ak∗ = b and (aℓ, aℓ+1) ∈ R
Gn
ι where ι is such that MG,a,ℓ+1 is the ι-successor of
MG,a,ℓ and so there are formulas ψ2 ∈ LLFP(τdg) such that not depending on the
pair (a, n), ψ2(G, a, b) = {(aℓ, ai) : ℓ ≤ i ≤ k∗}.
Now
• the probability of the following event is negligible (c < 2): for some d1 6=
d2 ∈ [n]\Mn,k∗ for every c: if ψ2(c, c, a, b) then (d1, c) ∈ R
G
2 ⇔ (d2, c) ∈ R
G
2 .
Ignoring this event, the following formulas defines a linear order on [n]\MG,a,k∗:
8We allow few a’s for which this fails. It suffices to have “for some a”, this helps for larger k.
9As then we can consider all the relevant sequences η, (and more)
20 SAHARON SHELAH
• ψ3(d1, d2, a, b) say: for some c we have ψ2(c, c, a, b)∧R2(d2, c)∧ ¬R2(d1, c)
and for any c1 if ψ2(c1, c, a, b) then R2(d1, c
′)↔ R2(d2, c′).
So (x, y, a, b) defines a linear order on [n]\MG,a,k∗ which has ≥ n− ⌊n
ζ⌋ elements.
We get using the same trick ψ4 ∈ LLFP(τdn) and ψ4(x, y, a, b) defines a linear
order on [n]. Now the formulas ψ0, . . . , ψ4 do not depend on n. Also for some
ψ5 ∈ LLFP(τdg)
• G |= ψ5(a, b) iff ψ4(−,−, a, b) defines a linear order (on G)
and for some ψ0 ∈ LLFP(τdg)
⊙ G |= ψ0[c1, a1, b1, c2, a2, b2] iff:
(a) (a1, b1), (a2, b2) ∈ ϕ5(G)
(b) |{c : G |= ψ4[c, c1, a2, b1)}| = |{c : G |= ψ4[c, c2, a2, b2]}|.
So the interpretation should be clear. 3.5
Conclusion 3.6. [Case B] For some ψ ∈ LLFP(τdg) for every random enough
Gn = Gn;α¯∗ we have:
• Gn |= ψ iff n is even.
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